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two questions: (1) Is it advisable, as a matter of governmental
policy, to further extend the power of such an administrative
body? (2) Has the Commission abused the power already granted
it by Congress? The first of these issues is beyond the scope of
this discussion, but the opinions considered above may shed some
light upon the second.
From this survey it may be concluded that, insofar as the
reorganization plan opinions handed down to date are concerned,
the Securities and Exchange Commission has not attempted to
go beyond its legislative mandate or even to goto extreme limits
possibly permitted by the broad language of the Act. In deter-
mining the fairness of proposed plans, adherence to accepted legal
criteria has characterized the opinions and, in its determination
of feasibility (or "soundness") of proposed capital structures, the
Commission has not required standards beyond those of sound
fiscal policy. In promoting the purposes of the Public Utility
Holding Company Act, the Securities and Exchange Commission
has carefully avoided the appearance of arbitrary conduct. It has
not, for example, dogmatically prohibited the use of voting trusts,
although it has made it plain that it will not countenance the use
of any device which will "unnecessarily" complicate capital
structures or permit abuse of fiduciary authority.
The moderation and flexibility with which the Securities and
Exchange Commission has handled the complex problems pre-
sented by proposed corporate reorganization plans heretofore
considered by it, merit much commendation. By avoiding dic-
tatorial practices, the Commission has set an example which, if
consistently followed by all administrative boards and commis-
sions, would considerably enhance the respect with which ad-
ministrative law, as a system, is now regarded.
BEN B. TAYLOR, JR.*
CHARACTERIZATION AS AN APPROACH TO THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS
Litigation may in a sense be divided into two categories. The
ordinary case involves operative facts and issues which are con-
nected with only that legislative jurisdiction in which the court
sits and the court simply applies the law of the forum. The sec-
ond category-the conflict of laws case-involves operative facts
* Member of the Baton Rouge Bar.
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and issues some of which are connected with legislative jurisdic-
tions other than that of the forum. In this type of case no one
system of positive law regulates the entire situation. The court
might either decide arbitrarily without reference to any system
of law, or apply its own law exclusively, or refer the matter to
the system of law with which the case seems to have the closest
association. This last course is the one followed.
It is usual to think of this reference as being accomplished
through the application of a conflicts rule, a rule of the forum by
which the issue as defined is referred to a certain law by means of
a connecting factor or place element. This connecting factor may
be a judicial concept or an extra-legal fact. Thus, capacity to
marry may be referred to the law of the domicile; succession to
an immovable may be referred to the law of its situs.
In 1891 Kahn1 in Germany pointed out that the same case
might be decided differently in different states because of the con-
flicts which might exist in the conflicts rules of the states con-
cerned. (1) The conflicts rules themselves might be patently dif-
ferent, as where capacity to marry is referred by one state to the
party's domiciliary law and by another state to his national law.
(2) The conflicts rules may be apparently the same, but actually
different because different meanings may be given to the connect-
ing factor in each state, as where domicile is the connecting factor
in each state, but one method of determining domicile does not
correspond to the other. (3) The conflicts rules may be apparently
the same in each state, with the connecting factors the same in
content, but the issue not defined in the same manner in each state,
as where the necessity of parental consent is legally defined as a
question of capacity in one state and as a question of form in an-
other.
The often cited case of Odgen v. Ogden2 may be given as an
illustration of the last type of conflict mentioned, namely the dif-
ference in the definition of the issue. A minor Frenchman had
married an Englishwoman in England without previously obtain-
ing the consent of his parents as required by French law. An Eng-
lish court considered the French requirement a matter of form
1. Kahn, Gesetzeskollisionen: ein Beitrag zur Lehre des internationalen
Privatrechts (1891) 30 Jhering Jahrbiicher fUr de Dogmatic des Heutigen
Romischen und Deutschen Privatrechts 1-143, and republished In Abhand-
lungen zum Internationalen Privatrecht von Franz Kahn, herausgegeben von
Otto Lenel und Hans Lewald, I (1928) 1-123, as summarized by Falconbridge,
Characterization in the Conflict of Laws (1937) 53 L. Q. Rev. 235, 238.
2. [1908] P. 46.
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and applied the English conflicts rule that form is governed by
the law of the place of celebration (England). The court found
the French law inapplicable and upheld the validity of the mar-
riage. Shortly before, a French court had to decide on the validity
of the same marriage. Defining the necessity of parental consent
as a question of capacity to marry, the French court applied the
French conflicts rule that such capacity is governed by the party's
national (French) law, and declared the marriage null. Both Eng-
land and France had the same conflicts rules that form is deter-
mined by the law of the place of celebration and capacity by the
law of the party's domicile (or nationality-here the same),8 but
a difference in the definition of the issue led to a difference in re-
sult. The problem of defining the issue and the connecting factor
is called the problem of characterization; this has also been called
"qualification," or "classification."'
Six years after Kahn's statement, Bartin5 concluded that the
problem could not be solved. To Bartin, conflicts rules were as
much a part of the law of the forum as the rules of internal law.
As such they were phrased in terms of the internal law. To give
them other characterizations, such as those of a foreign law, would
be to give them a meaning not intended by the sovereign. Hence
all characterizations must be by the law of the forum." Bartin
admitted that the sovereign may deliberately use a character-
ization which would fit similar concepts or institutions in other
3. Actually, there are two conflicting rules of reference on the question
of capacity, but as the Frenchman was domiciled in France by English law,
there would have been no difference in result in this case.
4. "Qualifications" is used almost exclusively on the Continent. For use
of the terms and a survey of the statements of the problem in English see
Robertson, A Survey of the Characterization Problem in the Conflict of
Laws (1939) 52 Harv. L. Rev. 747. The only other writers in the United
States who have given the problem any serious consideration are: Lorenzen,
The Theory of Qualifications in the Conflict of Laws (1920) 20 Col. L. Rev.
247; and Rheinstein, Comparative Law and the Conflict of Laws in Germany
(1935) 2 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 232, 257 et seq. 1 Beale, A Treatise of the Conflict
of Laws (2 ed. 1938) 55, § 7.2, dismisses the problem with the statement that
in America "all qualifications are determined by the law of the forum."
Stumberg, Conflict of Laws (1937) and Goodrich, Conflict of Laws (2 ed.
1938) seem to ignore the problem entirely. There will be occasion later
herein to explain the lack of material on this subject in the United States.
The question of determining the meaning of concepts in the foreign law
to which reference is made by the conflicts rule is now generally resolved
in favor of definition by the foreign law itself (see note 38, infra). It will
not be treated in this paper. The only problem here is that a judge must be
careful when using concepts of a system of law with which he may not be
familiar.
5. Bartin, De l'Impossibilit6 d'Arriver A. la Suppression D6finitive des
Conflits des Lois (Clunet, 1897) 24 Journal du Droit International Priv6 225-
255, 466-495, 720-728.
6. Id. at 235-240.
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systems of law, but such a characterization could not be used out-
side of its own jurisdiction. In considering this law the foreign
court would have to characterize its terms according to its own
local concepts.7
It is important to note that the conflicts rule has, according
to Bartin, the same binding force as a rule of internal law and
must be applied in the manner in which the sovereign under-
stands it. It is not such a law as will dispose of the issue, but a
rule of reference, one which will refer the issue to a certain law,
local or foreign, for determination;8 an "indicative" rather than
a "dispositive" rule." Therefore, the juridical definition or char-
acterization of the issue must be known before the conflicts rule
can be selected and the law referred to applied. In the words of
Falconbridge,10 the solution of a conflicts case requires the char-
acterization of the issue, selection of the law to be applied by
means of the conflicts rule, and application of the law selected
Each state having its own concepts and institutions which cannot
be expected to be the same in other states, the characterizations
of one state will not necessarily conform to those of another, and
therefore it is vain to expect uniformity of result for similar
conflict cases in different courts. Bartin concluded that there can
be no solution to such conflict of decisions in similar cases; this
could be eliminated only by having the same laws with similar
characterizations in every state; such uniformity cannot be ex-
pected.11
Bartin admitted two exceptions to his rule that characteriza-
tion must be made in accordance with the law of the forum. The
first was in determining (preliminary to characterization of the
issue) the movable or immovable nature of a thing, which he con-
sidered must always be by the law of the situs. 12 Bartin reasoned
to this exception on the basis of the security which would be
afforded to transactions. There could be no dispute as to the
location of a thing. All courts could seize upon this material fact
and characterize by the law of the place where the thing is
found.' The second exception was that the determination of the
applicable law should be left to the will or intention of the par-
7. Id. at 241 et seq.
8. Id. at 236, 239-240, 480, 732.
9. Taintor, Universality in the Conflict of Laws of Contracts (1939) 1
LOUISIANA LAW REvIEW 695, 696, n. 3, 4.
10. Falconbridge, supra note 1, at 235 et seq.
11. Bartin, supra note 5, at 734.
12. Id. at 246 et seq.
13. Id. at 251-255.
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ties wherever possible.14 Bartin, we are told,' 5 has come to realize
that this latter point is no exception at all because the forum
must first characterize the issue as one of "contract" before the
will or intention of the parties to act under one of the possibly
applicable laws may be considered. This analysis does not affect
the point which we wish to make here, namely, that sovereignty
does not always require that concepts of the local law be used
in the conflicts rule.16
It must be remembered that Bartin reasoned to the neces-
sity of characterization by the law of the forum on the ground
that to use foreign concepts in the local rule would deny the
intended application of the local conflicts rule. But if the use of
foreign concepts in a local conflicts rule might result in the mis-
application of that rule, the use of the foreign law in connection
with the local characterizations might result in a misapplication
of the foreign law.17 Therefore, argued Despagnet,5 characteriza-
tion of the issue must be made in terms of the law to be applied.
H. Donnedieu de Vabres5 admitted that the foreign law could
not be given its intended application with local characterizations,
but concluded that this result could not be avoided: how would
it be possible to determine what law is applicable before charac-
terizing the issue? Thus, in his opinion, Despagnet's views in-
volved a vicious circle.
Bartin's view of the approach to the conflict of laws has been
adopted by Arminjon 20 and Niboyet 2' in France, by Cheshire2 2 in
14. Id. at 472 et seq.
15. Rabel, Le Probl~me de la Qualification (Darras, 1933) 28 Revue de
Droit International Priv6 1, 14, n. 3; and Robertson, supra note 4, at 761,
citing (1930) 1 Recueil des Cours 608.
16. Cf. Robertson, supra note 4, at 759-760.
17. By extending Bartin's reasoning we could say that the sovereign
creating the conflicts rule has no intention to apply the foreign law, but only
a law of its own, the content of which is to be found by interpreting the
foreign law in terms of local concepts. That such is not actually the case
hardly needs refutation. The sovereign might as well direct that its internal
law be applied to conflicts cases. The fact that a use of the foreign law is
directed would seem to indicate an intention that it be interpreted and ap-
plied as in that foreign state.
18. Despagnet, Des Conflits de Lois Relatifs A la Qualifications des Rap-
ports Jurisdiques (Clunet, 1898) 25 Journal du Droit International Priv6 253,
261.
19. H. Donnedieu de Vabres, De l'Impossibilite d'une Solution Rationelle
et D~flnitive des Conflits des Lois (Clunet, 1905) 32 Journal du Droit Inter-
national Priv6 1231, 1236-1238.
20. 1 Arminjon, Precis de Droit International Priv6 (2 ed. 1927) 133-136.
For translated selections, see Harper and Taintor, Cases and Other Materials
on Judicial Technique in Conflict of Laws (1937) 258.
21. Niboyet, Notions Sommaires de Droit International Priv6 (3 ed. 1937)
121-125, nos 197-202.
22. Cheshire, Private International Law (2 ed. 1938) 24-45.
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England, and by Falconbridge 28 in Canada. In the United States,
Lorenzen takes the same view, 2' and Beale seems to be in accord
for he dismisses the problem with the statement that in America
"all qualifications are determined by the law of the forum."25
This is not as astonishing as it may seem at first, for the process
of characterization, selection, and application gives rise to diffi-
culty only if the concepts and institutions of the states involved
cannot be characterized in the same manner. Since the laws of
most of the states of the Union are based upon a common tradi-
tion of law, the concepts, institutions, and classification of the
internal laws are likely to be the same or so similar that conflicts
will arise but infrequently. Rheinstein has noted that the use of
concepts as a basis of aproach to the conflict of laws "is unob-
jectionable as long as we have to deal exclusively with conflicts
between various bodies of law inside of one single legal system,
e.g., between various statua of the medieval Italian cities, be-
tween various French coutumes, between various laws of the
ancient Dutch provinces, between various jurisdictions inside
the Common Law. ' 28 It would seem that the approach by means
of characterization, selection, and application may be used within
certain limits in the conflict of laws.
On the continent of Europe, where there are different tradi-
tions of law, the process of characterizing by the law of the forum
would not lead to satisfactory results. Certain writers, unlike
Bartin, Niboyet and Arminjon, could not reconcile themselves to
these results and sought other methods. These methods may be
roughly divided into two groups: one which sought to character-
ize on the basis of comparative law, and another which sought to
refer all matters to the law of a place which could be readily lo-
cated by a material fact or by a universally accepted legal con-
cept.
One way of avoiding Bartin's logic was to deny that the con-
flicts rule of the forum was drafted in terms of local concepts and
institutions. The terms used therein were to be understood as
terms of international significance, terms which were intended to
23. Falconbridge, supra note 1. Compare the summary of Falconbridge's
views by Robertson, supra note 4, at 766-767. For further discussion of Fal-
conbridge's views see infra, p. 722 et seq.
24. Lorenzen, supra note 4, at 268. For a summary of Lorenzen's views
see Robertson, supra note 4, at 747-751, 758-762. According to Robertson (at
747, n. 1), Lorenzen has since considerably modified his views.
25. 1 Beale, op. cit. supra note 4, at 55, § 7.2. See also Restatement of the
Conflict of Laws, § 7(a); Lorenzen, supra note 4, at 268.
26. Rheinstein, supra note 4, at 263.
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include and to refer to similar concepts and institutions in all
systems of law; that is, concepts and institutions which, though
perhaps not similar, were used for the same function, to protect
or to secure similar interests. Thus "tutorship" in a conflicts rule
would include in its meaning not only tutorship as understood in
the forum's internal law, but guardianship or any other institu-
tion with the same function in other systems of law. Similarly,
"usufruct" in connection with the property rights of the surviv-
ing spouse could include "dower."
Comparative law could be used to discover the corresponding
concepts and institutions in all systems of law and, with the grad-
ually extending adoption of the same conflicts rule, uniformity of
results could be obtained. This was the theory announced by
Rabel 27 in Germany and which seems to have been followed by
Wigny28 in France and Rheinstein 29 in the United States. Mer-
iggi,8 0 following a similar doctrine, declared that the number of
conflicts in institutions and concepts were very few indeed, and
that real conflicts would be found only in what he termed the
substrata of various systems of law. As long as the substrata are
the same, that is, as long as the aims of the law are the same,
conflicts would not appear. The institutions and concepts of the
internal law might differ in detail, but as long as they perform
the same function there would be no conflicts for they could be
used interchangeably."'
From these observations and from observations previously
made regarding the possibility of using characterizations of the lex
fori where different bodies of law in the same system or tradition
are involved, we are led to this conclusion: that the process of
characterization, selection, and application may be used as long as
the issue is characterized in terms of some concept or institution
common to all systems of law involved. If the different bodies of
27. Rabel, supra note 15, at 17.
28. Wigny, Remarques sur le Probl~me des Qualifications (Darras, 1936)
31 Revue Critique de Droit International 392, 418.
29. Rheinstein, supra note 4, at 264-268.
30. Meriggi, Les Qualifications en Droit International Priv6 (Darras,
1933) 28 Revue de Droit International Priv6 201, 205 et seq.
31. Beckett, The Question of Classification ("Qualification") In Private
International Law (1934) 15 B.Y.I.L. 46, as reported by Robertson, supra
note 4, at 754, 762-766, would seem to advocate characterization of the Issue
on the basis of conceptions of analytical jurisprudence as found by a study
of comparative law, but at the same time he practically denies this principle
by the broad exceptions for the characterization of which he would look to
the law of the forum. If Robertson's report on Beckett Is correct, we cannot




law belong to the same system or tradition, the common elements
may be found in the institutions and concepts themselves. If the
bodies of law are more widely separated in tradition, but agree
in seeking to perform the same functions and to protect the same
interests, the common elements will manifest themselves in the
function and purposes of the institutions. If the different bodies
of law do not seek to protect the same interests, in short, if they
are not based on the same philosophy of law, conflicts will appear
and they cannot be avoided. Thus the possibility of using the
system of characterization, selection, and application is directly
proportional to the points of similarity in the systems of law
involved. It must be noted that this method presupposes an ex-
amination of the various laws which may be applicable in order
to discover the characterization which will fit them all. This is
contrary to Bartin's reasoning that the foreign law cannot be
reached without the reference of the conflicts rule. Although the
approach through the conflicts rule is practical, it is artificial, as
will be shown below.
Falconbridge 82 maintains that characterization of the issue
should precede selection of the applicable law but is unable to
accept characterization by the law of the forum because of the
obviously unfair results to which it often leads. Likewise, charac-
terization on a strict comparative law basis is not acceptable to
Falconbridge because it would demand of the judge a vast and
complete knowledge of all systems of law.88 He therefore sought
to provide a via media.
Just what Falconbridge means by this via media is not clear
from his explanation, for he states that characterization of the
issue must precede selection of the connecting factor and then
proceeds:
"This characterization of the question-which may be provi-
sional and subject to revision-lays the foundation for the
Court's consideration of the concrete provisions of the laws of
various countries which are or may be applicable in the light
of the characterization of the main question or different as-
pects of that question."84
To say that characterization of the issue may be provisional and
subject to revision is inconsistent with the statement that charac-
32. Falconbridge, supra note 1, at 241, 245-246.




terization must precede selection of the connecting factor. Thus
it would seem that Falconbridge contradicts himself.
However, a consideration of what Falconbridge includes in
"characterization of the issue," and an analysis of his advocated
approach to the problem in the Ogden case seems to indicate that
he has confused-in the application of his principles-characteri-
zation of the issue and application of the law once selected-the
first and third steps to his process.85 Thus, in discussing the prob-
lem of the Ogden case,"6 Falconbridge remarks that the English
court should examine the laws of England and the laws of France,
construing the latter in its context-that is, according to French
characterizations-just as a French court would do, in order to
determine whether all provisions of English law essential to the
formal validity, and all provisions of French law essential to the
substantive validity of the marriage have been complied with.
Finding that the English law does not require parental consent as
essential to the formal validity of a marriage in England, it
should declare the English law inapplicable; but finding that the
French law does require parental consent as essential to the sub-
stantive validity of the marriage in that it considers it essential
to the party's capacity to marry, it should declare the marriage
null.87 Apparently, "form" and "capacity" are here his "provi-
sional characterizations."
What Falconbridge appears to have done is to characterize
the issue as "validity of the marriage" and to apply the conflicts
rules that formal validity of a marriage is determined according
to the law of the place of the celebration, and substantive validity
by the law of the domicile of the parties. Thus, in looking to the
English law to determine what related to form, and to the French
law to determine what related to capacity, Falconbridge was only
applying the law selected by the conflicts rule.
This seems to be the only way to interpret Falconbridge and
as thus interpreted his writings do not show a via media. They
do show the necessity of starting with the issue characterized in
terms of a concept which is understood in the same way by all
the systems of law possibly involved and the necessity of apply-
35. Cf. Robertson, supra note 4, at 767. Falconbridge seems to have done
this same thing in most of his examples of characterization of the issue.
It should be noted that what Robertson refers to as "primary" and "second-
ary" classification corresponds to Falconbridge's "characterization of the
issue" and "application of the law selected." The latter does not present any
particular problem. See note 4, supra.
36. See note 2 and text thereto.
37. Falconbridge, supra note 1, at 254.
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ing the foreign law as it is applied in the foreign state. The first
point is particularly the subject of this paper; the second is now
generally admitted8 8 and need not be considered herein. Since
Falconbridge has not given us a via media on the question of
characterizing the issue 3 and since he at least impliedly recog-
nizes the need for universality on this point, we are forced to
return to our finding that characterization of the issue must be
in terms of function, characterizations to be discovered through
the study of comparative law.
Now whereas the comparative law method would seem to be
satisfactory for the purpose of characterizing the issue in the
case, it could not be used for the purpose of characterizing the
connecting factor. The connecting factor is a place element. Even
if the issue is given a universal characterization, the outcome of
the case will depend upon the system of law to which it is re-
ferred. Thus it is imperative that the system of law referred to
be the same regardless of the court in which the issue arises.
Similarity of function in the connecting factor would not suffice
to accomplish this because similarity of function does not neces-
sarily (and often does not) mean identity of place reference. For
example, "domicile" and "nationality" are place elements used
by different courts for the same issue, but a party's domicile and
nationality may or may not coincide and so the result of the case
may depend upon the choice of forum. Even the concepts "domi-
cile" and "nationality" may be determined differently in different
states. It would seem, therefore, that connecting factors must be
universally accepted for the same issues. This universality would
probably be best accomplished through international treaties
adopting and defining the connecting factor.40
The realization of the importance of universality in the con-
necting factor has been, we believe, the reason which prompted
Frankenstein4 ' to devise his approach. This noted German in-
ternational law lawyer would reduce the characterization of all
issues to the concepts "personal" and "real." He applies to the
first a universally accepted notion of nationality for a connecting
38. Even by Bartin. Robertson, supra note 4, at 761, citing I Recueil des
Cours 608. See also Cheshire, op. cit. supra note 22, at 38.
39. Falconbridge's lack of a via media seems to be confirmed by his
later statement that, as a general rule, characterization of the issue must be
by the lex for4. Falconbridge, supra note 1, at 542, 543. Cf. Robertson, supra
note 4, at 766, 767.
40. This does not mean, however, that comparative law could not be
used to determine the best place element to be selected.
41. Frankenstein, Une Doctrine Moderne du Droit International Priv6
(Darras, 1932) 27 Revue de Droit International Priv6 47.
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factor, and to the second the unmistakable law of the situs of the
thing. The manner in which he arrives at his conclusions is in-
genious. All laws relate to persons or to things; the solution of
problems of conflict of laws lies, therefore, in discovering the
closest points of contact between persons and things and the
juridical order. Persons are more closely connected with their
nations than with any other idea and hence the national law
should be used in all cases of purely personal relations. Besides,
the idea of nationality recommends itself because of its stability.
But where the relation is between persons with regard to things,
Frankenstein reasoned that a person is related not only to one
other person, but to all persons in the world. As it is impossible
to apply all systems of law, the only thing to do is to choose one
upon which all persons can agree and which can be easily de-
termined; hence no better solution can be found than to apply
the law of the situs of the thing. 2
Frankenstein's system would be difficult to put into execu-
tion. To say the least, it is doubtful whether the national law of
the parties is always the law most closely connected with an
issue, and it would be difficult at times to determine whether the
issue is "real" or "personal." But the fact that such a system has
been advocated does show the importance of having connecting
factors universally accepted.
We are now in a position to announce what we believe is the
best method to follow in approaching the conflict of laws. The
issue must be characterized on the basis of corresponding con-
cepts and institutions in all the systems of law which may be in-
volved. For this purpose comparative law must be the guide. If
there is nothing corresponding in the systems and if they are
fundamentally opposed to each other, it is useless to attempt to
reconcile them and the court should dispose of the case in what-
ever manner it deems best for the interest of all concerned. If
some corresponding concept can be found, however, it will be
necessary to have all systems of law refer this concept or institu-
tion to the law of the same state. For this purpose the aim of the
conflict of laws should be to have all states agree on connecting
factors or place elements. This should be possible to a great ex-
tent if not in all cases, for the place element has little to do with
the method by which interests are secured in the internal law,
42. Id. at 50 et seq. Compare the system of Cock, discussed by Delage,
Une Nouvelle Th~orie pour R6soudre le Conflit des Lois (Clunet, 1936) 63
Journal du Droit International Priv6 1038, 1042 et seq.
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and international agreements would possibly be the best means.
Therefore, the science of conflict of laws should seek to discover
by a study of comparative law the corresponding concepts and
institutions in all systems of law and seek to have the same con-
necting factors universally adopted.18 Only in this manner will
any degree of uniformity be obtained in the method of solving
conflicts cases. 4
This goal may not be susceptible of immediate or even ulti-
mate complete achievement. But it does seem that once the simi-
larity of institutions and concepts can be shown by comparative
law it should not be too difficult to reach an agreement on the
rules of reference. Already in the more widely accepted institu-
tions we see near universality in results because of similarity in
effect, though not always in form, of the conflicts rules used.
Barbey 45 has shown that a great deal of universality of result exists
in the conflict of laws in contract matters in English, French and
American law. Taintor has shown that there is even greater uni-
versality in this matter than Barbey found, 4 and has discovered
a similar tendency in marriage cases in the United States.47 Cock,
we are told, has erected his system of approach to the conflict of
laws on the universality of results in conflict cases. 8 And Robert-
son, while discussing the characterization of property, has shown
that considerable uniformity exists regarding the laws to which
such matters are referred.49
Something must be said of the method of approach through
a conflicts rule or, what is the same thing, through characteriza-
tion, selection and application. Bartin concluded that characteri-
zation could be made by the law of the forum alone because he
conceived of the conflicts rules as rules of reference created by
the sovereign in the same manner as an internal rule of law. To
say the least, it would be difficult to imagine a state arbitrarily
referring a matter to a foreign law if it did not consider that the
43. It must be noted that universality in conflicts rules would necessarily
dispense with the notion of renvoi.
44. Cf. J. Donnedieu de Vabres, L'Evolution de la Jurisprudence Fran-
gaise en Mati~re de Conflit des Lois depuis le Debut du XXe Sicle (1938)
765, 766.
45. Barbey, Le Conflit des Lois en Matitre de Contrats dans le Droit des
Etats-Unis d'Amnrique et le Droit Anglais Compar6s au Droit Frangais
(1938).
46. Taintor, supra note 9, at 712, 734-736.
47. Taintor, What Law 'Governs the Ceremony, Incidents and Status of
Marriage (1939) 19 B.U.L. Rev. 353.
48. Cock, as reported by Delage, supra note 42, at 1038.
49. Robertson, The Characterization of Property in the Conflict of Laws
(1940) 28 Geo. L.J. 739.
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foreign law had more connection with the facts than its own law.
Instead,- it appears that the conflicts rule must be a generalization
of what a court has been doing in certain factual situations. It
is true that conflicts rules have been codified and enacted just as
rules of internal law, but this in itself would not deprive the rule
of its character or purpose.
That a conflicts rule is really not a rule of reference is dem-
onstrated by the fact that it is abandoned in individual cases
when it does not lead to satisfactory results; courts use one con-
necting factor or another in order to reach results which they
deem desirable50 Again, we find well settled conflicts rules de-
nied application by reason of the doctrine of public policy, the
policy against circumvention of the law, the doctrine of acquired
rights, and the practice of varying the characterization of the
issue itself.51 Besides, in cases where all the facts have taken
place in one state and there does not appear to be any connection
with another, even a foreign court does not hesitate to apply the
substantive law of that state in its entirety. 2 Rheinstein'8 has
suggested that the approach to the conflicts case is no different
from that used in an ordinary case in which internal law will be
applied. In the latter instance, all the facts are connected with
one state alone and so the court never thinks of applying any
other law. In a conflicts case, the facts seem to have some con-
nection with other states and thus the problem arises as to which
law should be applied. It would seem that a conflicts case is de-
cided by selecting the law to be applied on the basis of the great-
est connection between the facts and a system of law, in short,
on the basis of what law would seem to have the most valid
claim to be applied.14
The method of working with conflicts rules is not to be con-
demned because of its artificiality. The economy of effort and the
wisdom of following past solutions which have proved satisfactory
would sanction the use of the conflicts rule as a rule of reference,
as a guide. But the nature of the conflicts rule must be kept in
mind and its application should not be allowed to defeat the pur-
50. Cf. Marvin Safe Co. v. Norton, 48 N.J. Law 410, 7 AtI. 418, 57 Am.
Rep. 566 (1886); and Charles T. Dougherty Co., Inc. v. Krimke, 105 N.J. Law
470, 144 Ati. 617 (1929).
51. J. Donnedieu de Vabres, op. cit. supra note 44, at 764. Niboyet, op. cit.
supra note 21, at 120, 134, 141, nos 196, 216, 226.
52. Robertson, supra note 4, at 760, n. 20.
53. Rheinstein, supra note 4, at 261-262.
54. J. Donnedieu de Vabres, op. cit. supra note 44, at 740 et seq., has
shown that this Is the conclusion to be drawn from French jurisprudence.
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poses of the law. The doctrines of public policy and the policy
against circumvention of the law will preclude undesirable re-
sults. By keeping in mind that the conflicts rule is merely a guide
based on past experience we can understand how the court can
examine all the laws which may be applicable before character-
izing the issue. The conflicts rule will also provide a means of
working towards universality of results in cases where similar
interests are involved. Once the similarity of institutions and
concepts is realized through a study of comparative law, the way
is open to the universal adoption of connecting factors. In this
method lies the future of the conflict of laws. 55
ROBERT A. PASCAL*
EFFECT OF THE FORM OF THE BILL OF LADING
ON PASSAGE OF TITLE IN LOUISIANA
SECTION 40 (B) UNIFORM BILLS OF LADING ACT:-
"Where by the bill the goods are deliverable to the seller
or to his agent, or to the order of the seller or of his agent, the
seller thereby reserves the property in the goods. But if, ex-
cept for the form of the bill, the property would have passed
to the buyer on shipment of the goods, the seller's property in
the goods shall be deemed to be only for the purpose of secur-
ing performance by the buyer of his obligations under the
contract."
Under the common law 2 as well as the law of Louisiana' a
sale of specific goods is presumed to transfer the property therein
as soon as the contract is completed, although the price has not
yet been paid nor delivery of possession effected. Likewise, when
55. As to the necessity of universality in conflicts rules, see Levy-Ull-
mann, La Doctrine Universaliste en Matibre de Conflit des Lois, In Barbey,
op. cit. supra note 45, at vii-xix.
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1. La. Act 94 of 1912, § 40(b) [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 8104(b)].
2. Crug v. Gorham, 74 Conn. 541, 51 Atl. 519 (1902); Warner v. Warner,
30 Ind. App. 578, 66 N.E. 760 (1903). See E. L. Welch Co. v. Lobart Elevator
Co., 122 Minn. 432, 436, 142 N.W. 828, 830 (1913); 1 Williston, Sales (2 ed. 1924)
529, 530, 531, § 264.
3. Art. 2456, La. Civil Code of 1870: "The sale is considered to be perfect
between the parties, and the property is of right acquired to the purchaser
with regard to the seller, as soon as there exists an agreement for the object
and for the price thereof, although the object has not yet been delivered, nor
the price paid."
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